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A.		Notion
1		Regime	theory 	is	an	approach	within	international	relations	theory,	a	sub-discipline	of	political
science,	which	seeks	to	explain	the	occurrence	of	co-operation	among	States	by	focusing	on	the
role	that	regimes	play	in	mitigating	international	anarchy	and	overcoming	various	collective	action
problems	among	States	(International	Relations,	Principal	Theories;	State;	see	also	Co-operation,
International	Law	of).	Different	schools	of	thought	within	international	relations	have	emerged,	and
various	analytical	approaches	exist	within	the	 regime	theory 	itself	(see	Sec.	F.3	below).
However,	typically	 regime	theory 	is	associated	with	neoliberal	institutionalism	that	builds	on	a
premise	that	regimes	are	central	in	facilitating	international	co-operation	and	constraining	the
behaviour	of	States.	Thus,	in	international	relations	literature,	 regime	theory 	is	often	used
interchangeably	with	the	terms	‘institutionalism’	or	‘neoliberal	institutionalism’.
1.		Definition	of	a	‘Regime’
2		While	the	precise	definition	of	a	regime	is	debated,	a	regime	is	most	commonly	understood	to
refer	to	a	set	of	‘principles,	norms,	rules	and	decision-making	procedures	around	which	actors’
expectations	converge	in	a	given	area	of	international	relations’	(Krasner	2),	as	Stephen	Krasner
has	suggested.	A	regime	creates	convergence	of	expectations,	establishes	standards	of
behaviour,	and	cultivates	a	general	sense	of	obligation.	Regimes	mitigate	anarchy	that	would
otherwise	prevail	in	international	relations	and	thereby	facilitate	co-operation	among	States	and
other	potential	actors.	International	regimes	should	not	be	seen	as	quasi-governments
(Governments),	the	purpose	of	which	would	be	to	create	a	centralized	authority	to	govern	world
politics.	It	is	more	accurate	to	think	of	regimes	as	institutions	involving	States—and	increasingly
also	non-State	actors—who	seek	to	realize	their	long-term	objectives	and	structure	and	stabilize
their	relations	to	the	benefit	of	all	the	members	of	the	regime.
2.		Different	Types	of	Regimes
3		Regimes	exist	in	various	domains	of	international	politics.	There	are,	for	example,	collective
security	regimes	(including	United	Nations	[UN]	norms,	principles,	and	procedures	constraining	the
use	of	force	in	foreign	affairs;	Use	of	Force,	Prohibition	of),	economic	regimes	(including
international	trade	regime	and	international	monetary	regime;	International	Bank	for	Reconstruction
and	Development	[IBRD];	International	Monetary	Fund	[IMF];	World	Trade	Organization	[WTO]),
human	rights	regimes	(including	the	European	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Human	Rights	and
Fundamental	Freedoms	[1950]	and	various	international	treaties	and	customary	norms	protecting
civil,	political,	economic,	and	social	rights),	and	environmental	regimes	(including	regimes
protecting	biodiversity	or	regulating	emissions;	Biological	Diversity,	International	Protection;
Environment,	International	Protection;	see	also	Emissions	Trading).
4		Regimes	are	traditionally	thought	of	as	being	composed	of	States.	More	recent	studies	of
regimes,	however,	acknowledge	that	regimes	comprising	non-governmental	organizations	or
individuals	can	also	guide	and	regulate	the	behaviour	of	States	and	various	non-State	actors	(firms,
groups,	individuals).
3.		Distinguishing	International	Regimes	from	International
Agreements	and	International	Organizations
5		Robert	Keohane,	who	has	shaped	the	study	of	international	regimes	probably	more	than	any
other	scholar,	has	distinguished	regimes	from	international	agreements.	Regimes	are	often	created
when	there	are	potential	gains	from	agreements	but	when	agreements	are	costly	or	difficult	to
reach.	Instead	of	pursuing	negotiations	on	an	ad	hoc	basis,	agreements	can	be	nested	within	a
more	comprehensive	regime	that	can	facilitate	the	negotiation	of,	and	compliance	with,	the
agreement.	This	is	especially	true	when	issue	density—the	number	and	importance	of	interrelated
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issues	within	a	given	policy	space—is	high.	While	ad	hoc	agreements	might	be	adequate	to	deal
with	low	issue	density	matters,	there	are	likely	to	be	important	economies	of	scale	associated	with
an	international	regime	when	issue	density	is	high.
6		Regimes	should	also	be	distinguished	from	formal	international	organizations	(International
Organizations	or	Institutions,	General	Aspects).	While	many	regimes	are	accompanied	by	formal
organizations,	they	can	also	consist	of	a	looser	set	of	norms,	principles,	and	procedures	that
shape	States’	expectations	and	guide	their	behaviour.	The	International	Atomic	Energy	Agency
(IAEA),	for	instance,	is	an	international	organization	that	forms	part	of	a	more	broadly	understood
nuclear	non-proliferation	regime,	which	again	belongs	to	a	broader	collective	security	regime	(Non-
Proliferation	Treaty	[1968]).	Similarly,	the	WTO	is	a	part	of	a	larger	trade	regime	that	encompasses
rules,	norms,	and	principles	in	addition	to	the	procedures	and	the	organizational	capacity	that	the
WTO	provides	for	the	regime.	Trade	regime,	on	the	other	hand,	is	nested	within	a	broader
international	economic	regime.	International	regimes	can	also	be	distinguished	from	international
organizations	by	thinking	of	regimes	as	being	restricted	to	a	particular	issue-area	of	international
relations	(eg	collective	security,	economic	relations)	whereas	an	international	organization
(including,	for	instance,	the	UN),	can	have	a	sphere	of	activity	that	spans	various	different	issue
areas.	However,	the	studies	of	regimes	and	international	organizations	are	closely	related	and
often	overlap.
B.		 Regime	Theory ’s	Underlying	Assumptions	about	the	State
System
7		Regime	theory 	regards	States	as	principal	actors	in	world	politics.	States	are	assumed	to	be
rational,	unitary	actors	who	seek	to	maximize	their	national	self-interest.	Rationality	means	that
States	have	ordered	and	consistent	preferences	that	lead	them	to	pursue	policies	that	maximize
their	individual	utility.	These	assumptions	are	shared	with	a	realist	paradigm	of	international
relations	(see	Sec.	F.3.	(a)	below).
8		Unlike	realism,	 regime	theory 	emphasizes	that	States’	interests	are	not	necessarily
conflictual.	International	politics	is	not	a	zero-sum	game	where	a	gain	for	one	State	would
necessarily	mean	a	loss	to	another	State.	States	are	assumed	to	be	motivated	by	absolute	instead
of	relative	gains	(see	Sec.	F.3.	(a)	below).	States	often	have	common	interests	with	other	States
and	engage	in	co-operation	with	one	another	to	pursue	joint	gains.	Common	interests	do	not	mean
that	States’	interests	would	be	identical.	Instead,	co-operation	takes	place	when	States	mutually
adjust	their	policies	in	situations	where	they	have	both	conflicting	and	common	interests.	States
consider	future	consequences	of	their	present	actions	and	adopt	a	long-term	view	to	interaction
with	other	States.	When	States	perceive	that	there	are	benefits	from	co-operation,	they	are
sometimes	willing	to	forego	their	short-term	interests	to	accomplish	their	common	interests	in	the
long	term.
9		Regime	theory 	acknowledges	that	regimes	are	significant	in	facilitating	co-operation	among
States,	and	capable	of	exerting	independent	influence	on	them.	The	presence	of	regimes	modifies
anarchy	that	would	otherwise	prevail	in	international	relations.	The	distribution	of	capabilities
among	States,	while	not	irrelevant,	is	not	the	only	determinant	of	international	outcomes.	In	addition
to	power,	regimes	matter.
C.		How	Do	Regimes	Enhance	the	Likelihood	of	Co-operation	and
Compliance	with	International	Law?
1.		How	Do	Regimes	Facilitate	the	Making	of	Commitments?
10		Regimes	facilitate	international	commitments	by	reducing	transaction	costs	through
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institutionalizing	co-operation	and	thereby	decreasing	the	costs	of	future	agreements.	When
international	trade	agreements,	for	instance,	are	agreed	upon	in	the	WTO	framework,	States	can
rely	on	the	regime’s	established	procedures	and	principles	that	guide	the	negotiation[s].	In	this	way
States	can	avoid	the	costs	of	creating	new	rules	each	time	a	new	agreement	is	negotiated.
11		States	often	lack	information	relating	to	the	outcomes	of	co-operation,	risks	involved,	and	the
preferences	of	other	States.	This	type	of	uncertainty	may	prevent	States	from	accomplishing	a
mutually	beneficial	agreement.	By	providing	information	and	facilitating	communication	among
States,	regimes	can	alleviate	uncertainty	and	thereby	increase	the	likelihood	of	co-operation.
12		An	agreement	in	the	framework	of	a	broader	regime	creates	conditions	for	reciprocity	by
allowing	for	issue	linkages	that	can	be	employed	to	compensate	parties	that	would	lose	from	the
agreement.	Negotiating	parties	may	seek	strategic	linkages	to	broaden	the	scope	for	an	acceptable
compromise	in	situations	where	gains	within	a	given	issue	area	are	asymmetrically	distributed	and,
consequently,	where	no	agreement	can	be	reached	on	a	single	issue	alone.	A	successful	strategic
linkage	is	able	to	offset	the	negative	distributional	consequences	that	would	arise	if	the	agreement
was	constrained	to	a	single	issue	area.	By	broadening	side-payments	that	are	available,	a
distributive	(win-lose)	bargaining	game	can	be	converted	into	an	integrative	(win-win)	bargaining
game.
13		Regimes	also	enhance	the	continuity	of	co-operative	relationships	among	States.	This	creates
conditions	for	diffuse	reciprocity.	Unlike	in	non-iterated	negotiations	where	States	seek	immediate
benefits	consistent	with	specific	reciprocity,	diffuse	reciprocity	refers	to	a	continuing	(iterated)
relationship	of	exchange	that	at	any	given	time	may	not	be	reciprocated,	but	where	States’	co-
operative	actions	will	be	repaid	and	balanced	in	the	long	run.	This	makes	it	easier	to	strike	a	deal	in
negotiations	even	when	instant	benefits	for	all	parties	are	not	available.
14		Regimes	are	also	effective	in	curtailing	domestic	opposition	to	a	particular	international
agreement.	International	regimes	can	be	employed	to	lock	in	gains	from	international	co-operation
vis-à-vis	not	only	other	negotiating	parties	but	also	regime	supporters’	domestic	opponents	and
future	governments.
2.		How	Do	Regimes	Facilitate	the	Compliance	with	Commitments?
15		The	fear	of	being	exploited	by	other	States	forms	an	impediment	to	international	co-operation.
Regimes	can	mitigate	this	fear	by	decreasing	the	likelihood	of	cheating	once	the	agreement	is
reached.	By	monitoring	the	behaviour	of	members	of	the	regime,	regimes	ensure	that	non-
compliance	by	any	given	party	is	brought	to	the	attention	of	other	parties.	Regimes	therefore	make
commitments	more	credible	and	cheating	less	likely.
16		Iteration	lengthens	the	shadow	of	the	future,	reducing	the	incentives	to	defect	from	agreed
commitments.	Knowing	that	one	State’s	defection	is	likely	to	be	retaliated	against	by	a	mutual
defection	of	another	State	in	the	subsequent	round	of	interaction,	each	State	has	the	motivation	to
comply	with	its	obligations	in	the	first	place.
17		When	States	know	that	their	relations	will	continue	in	subsequent	instances	of	interaction,	the
importance	of	reputation	increases.	Regimes	help	to	augment	or	reduce	the	reputation	of	each
State	by	providing	standards	of	behaviour	against	which	States’	conduct	can	be	assessed.	By
reneging	on	commitments	under	a	regime,	a	State	diminishes	its	reputation	as	a	trustworthy
partner,	undermining	simultaneously	its	potential	future	gains	from	co-operation.	Conversely,	a
State	that	earns	a	reputation	of	adhering	to	its	commitments	can	expect	other	States	to	be	willing	to
engage	in	co-operative	arrangements	with	it	in	the	future.
18		Strategic	linkages	facilitate	not	only	the	making	of	commitments	but	also	States’	compliance
with	them.	When	issues	are	linked,	States	have	fewer	incentives	to	renege	on	their	commitments	as
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non-compliance	in	one	issue	area	can	negatively	affect	their	goals	in	another	issue	area.
D.		Creation	of	Regimes,	Regime	Transformation,	and	Regime
Persistence
19		Regime	formation	is	most	commonly	explained	by	functional	reasons.	Robert	Keohane	views
regimes	as	responses	to	collective	action	problems	that	arise	from	the	self-interest	of	States.	When
the	pursuit	of	individual	interests	by	States	would	lead	to	socially	sub-optimal	outcomes,	rational
States	eschew	independent	action	and	co-operate	by	forming	regimes.	In	other	words,	regimes	are
created	because	they	are	expected	to	enhance	the	welfare	of	their	creators.
20		Oran	Young	has	distinguished	between	spontaneous,	negotiated	and	imposed	regimes.
Spontaneous	regimes	emerge	when	States’	expectations	converge	naturally	in	the	absence	of
conscious	efforts	to	create	a	regime.	Negotiated	regimes	involve	bargaining	and	explicit	consent
on	the	part	of	participating	actors.	Imposed	regimes	are	created	when	powerful	States	impose	a
regime	on	weaker	States	by	resorting	to	coercion,	co-option,	or	manipulation	of	other	States’
interests	or	incentives	(see	also	Economic	Coercion).
21		Powerful	States	frequently	have	a	decisive	role	in	the	formation	of	a	regime	and	the	shaping	of
its	content.	While	rejecting	the	hegemonic	stability	theory	in	its	purest	form	(Hegemony;	see	Sec.
F.3.	(a)	below),	 regime	theory 	acknowledges	that	regimes	are	created	against	the	backdrop	of
the	distribution	of	power	among	States.	However,	once	created,	regimes	are	likely	to	create	a
dynamic	of	their	own.
22		Regimes	are	rarely	static	constructs	and	can	transform	as	a	result	of	both	internal	and	external
forces	that	affect	some	essential	elements	of	the	regime.	Changing	economic,	political,	and	social
factors	as	well	as	shifts	in	a	regime’s	underlying	power	structures	and	possible	internal
contradictions	can	transform	a	regime.	Regimes	frequently	continue	to	persist	despite	the	changes
they	undergo.	Regime	persistence	is	often	explained	by	the	costs	involved	in	establishing	a
regime.	Creating	a	new	regime	in	response	to	new	conditions	would	entail	various	learning	and
other	start-up	costs,	making	it	rational	to	remain	involved	with	an	existing	regime.	This	also	leads	to
path	dependence,	as	increasing	returns	on	scale	can	be	exploited	by	adding	more	issues	to	an
existing	regime,	especially	when	the	regime	has	a	relatively	good	track	record	of	facilitating
international	co-operation.
E.		Evolution	of	 Regime	Theory
23		International	institutions	have	been	studied	extensively	since	their	proliferation,	especially
following	World	War	II.	In	the	post-war	world,	the	studies	focused	first	on	formal	international
organizations.	By	the	1970s	international	relations	scholars	turned	their	attention	to	international
regimes	more	generally.	This	shift	in	the	research	agenda	represented	an	attempt	to	analyse
international	co-operation	and	governance	more	broadly.	In	the	1980s,	the	work	of	Robert	Keohane
and	his	neoliberal,	functional	explanations	for	the	creation	and	maintenance	of	regimes	provided
lasting	contributions	to	the	debate	on	international	regimes.
24		Regime	theory 	emerged	as	a	challenge	to	the	realist	school	of	international	relations	(see
Sec.	F.3.	(a)	below).	Following	two	world	wars,	States’	inability	to	limit	war	in	their	international
relations	had	become	obvious,	heightening	the	need	for	increased	international	co-operation.
Regime	theorists	viewed	the	realists’	focus	on	State	power	and	interest	as	too	narrow,	emphasizing
common	interests	shared	by	all	States	and	their	growing	interdependence	among	one	another.
25		Realists	responded	forcefully	to	the	rising	study	of	regimes.	They	challenged	some	of	the
central	assumptions	of	 regime	theory 	and	prompted	an	intense	debate	on	whether	regimes	in
fact	have	any	independent	effect	on	States’	behaviour.	Among	other	questions,	the	debate
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focused—and	often	still	focuses—on	the	nature	and	consequences	of	anarchy,	the	likelihood	of	the
occurrence	of	international	co-operation,	the	relative	importance	of	absolute	versus	relative	gains,
and	the	priority	of	State	goals	(economic	welfare	versus	security).	Realists	claimed	that	the
distribution	of	capabilities	continues	to	determine	the	likelihood	and	the	form	of	international	co-
operation	and	that	the	regimes	have	little	relevance	independent	of	State	power.	Regime
theory ’s	theoretical	appeal	was	nonetheless	strengthened	after	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	(1947–
91)	when	some	of	the	realists’	predictions	failed	to	materialize.	Many	realists	had	argued	that	the
European	integration	was	largely	a	result	of	the	United	States-Soviet	Union	bipolarity	and	predicted
that	the	European	regime	would	wane	as	a	result	of	the	collapse	of	one	of	the	super	powers	and
the	subsequent	withdrawal	of	the	United	States	from	Europe.	As	this	did	not	happen,	 regime
theories 	claimed	that	institutionalized	co-operation	can	indeed	sustain	in	the	absence	of	a
hegemony.
26		The	mainstream	 regime	theory 	is	firmly	rooted	in	the	rationalist	tradition.	Thus,	throughout	its
evolution,	economic	theories	focusing	on	the	role	of	information	and	transaction	costs	have
influenced	the	work	of	regime	theorists.	Regime	theory 	also	draws	on	various	game-theoretic
models	developed	in	economics	to	illustrate	different	strategic	situations	and	to	predict	and	explain
the	likelihood	of	international	co-operation.
F.		Differences	with	Respect	to	Other	Approaches	to	International
Law
1.		Descriptive	and	Prescriptive	Approaches	to	International	Law
Compared
27		The	principal	objective	of	 regime	theory ,	like	that	of	other	international	relations	theories,	is
to	explain	and	predict	international	outcomes.	In	seeking	to	establish	causal	relationships	and
ascertain	why	and	how	rules	evolve	and	how	they	influence	State	behaviour,	 regime	theory
provides	a	descriptive	policy-analysis.	Instead	of	focusing	on	the	content	of	international	rules,
regime	theory 	adopts	an	instrumentalist	approach	to	international	law.	In	contrast,	prescriptive
approaches	to	international	law	focus	on	formal	rules	with	which	States	have	a	legal	obligation	to
comply.	Prescriptive	analysis	seeks	to	define	not	only	what	international	law	is	but	also	what	it
ought	to	be.	Prescriptive,	rule-oriented	approaches	to	international	law	include,	for	instance,	Legal
Positivism,	which	emphasizes	State	consent	as	a	source	of	international	law,	and	natural	law,	which
holds	that	international	law	can	be	derived	from	higher	principles	of	right	and	wrong	and	is
therefore	eternally	and	universally	valid	(Natural	Law	and	Justice).
2.		Empiricist	and	Critical	Approaches	to	International	Law	Compared
28		As	an	empirical	study	rooted	in	the	positivist	tradition	of	social	science,	 regime	theory 	can
be	contrasted	with	critical	approaches	to	international	law,	including	New	Stream	and	feminist
theories	of	international	law	(Feminism,	Approach	to	International	Law;	Sociological	Theories	of
International	Law).	Unlike	empirical	studies	that	test	hypotheses	against	evidence	and	facts,	critical
approaches	follow	an	interpretive	method	that	is	sceptical	of	objective	knowledge.	The	New	Stream
approach	views	law	as	a	discourse	and	focuses	on	disclosing	the	hidden	ideologies	and	structures
that	lie	behind	that	discourse.	The	feminist	approach	to	international	law	seeks	to	expose	the
gender	bias	embedded	in	existing	international	legal	rules	and	examines	the	impact	that	any	such
bias	has	on	women.
3.		Different	International	Relations	Approaches	to	International	Law
Compared
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(a)		How	Does	the	 Regime	Theory 	Differ	from	Realism?
29		Regime	theory 	shares	many	of	the	analytical	assumptions	of	realism,	which	also	builds	on
the	presumption	that	States	are	rational,	unitary	actors	that	act	in	pursuit	of	maximizing	their
individual	national	interests.	Both	theories	hence	reflect	a	commitment	to	a	rationalist	research
agenda.	Realists	are,	however,	considerably	more	pessimistic	about	the	prospects	of	international
co-operation	among	egoistic	States	that	operate	in	an	anarchic	system.	Realists	believe	that
international	outcomes	reflect	the	distribution	of	power	among	States.	Unlike	regime	theorists,	who
believe	that	States	engage	in	international	co-operation	largely	in	pursuit	of	absolute	gains,	realists
have	stressed	that	States	are	most	concerned	with	relative	gains.	In	other	words,	while	 regime
theory 	claims	that	States	care	only	about	their	own	gains	and	losses	from	international	co-
operation,	realists	argue	that	States’	willingness	to	co-operate	depends	on	whether	they	achieve
more	gains	relative	to	other	States	by	co-operating.
30		According	to	realists,	international	regimes	are	merely	reflections	of	prevailing	power	relations
among	States.	Powerful	States	create	regimes	to	institutionalize	and	enhance	their	power
advantages.	Regimes	are	hence	epiphenomenal	and	incapable	of	affecting	State	behaviour	or
mitigating	international	anarchy.	Realists	have	further	argued	that	the	establishment	of	a	regime
can	be	explained	by	the	rise	of	a	hegemonic	power.	Conversely,	the	collapse	of	a	regime	is
explained	by	the	decline	of	a	hegemonic	power.	This	is	consistent	with	the	hegemonic	stability
theory,	which	postulates	that	the	stability	of	the	international	system	requires	a	dominant	State	to
create	and	enforce	the	rules	of	interaction	among	the	members	of	the	system.
(b)		How	Does	the	 Regime	Theory 	Differ	from	Liberalism?
31		Liberal	international	relations	theory	contests	the	State-centric	approach	of	 regime	theory
and	realism	by	focusing	on	individuals	and	groups	as	fundamental	actors	in	world	politics.	Unlike
regime	theory ,	which	assumes	States	to	be	unitary	actors	with	fixed	preferences,	liberal	theory
emphasizes	that	States’	interests	are	the	function	of	the	individual	preferences	of	various	sub-State
actors	operating	in	society.	Liberal	theory	assumes	that	a	conflict	arises	when	States’	interests
clash.	The	way	to	solve	this	conflict	is	to	find	ways	to	align	State	interests	by	trying	to	change	the
preferences	of	groups	and	individuals	within	a	State.
32		Liberal	theory	assumes	that	the	likelihood	of	international	co-operation	is	not	dependent	on	the
structure	of	the	international	system	or	the	existence	of	a	regime.	Whether	co-operation	takes
place	or	not	is	the	function	of	the	degree	of	convergence	of	States’	domestic	interests.	If	States’
interests	are	aligned,	co-operation	is	possible	and	it	may—but	may	not—manifest	itself	in	the	form
of	a	regime.
(c)		How	Does	the	 Regime	Theory 	Differ	from	Constructivism?
33		Constructivist	approach	differs	both	from	the	 regime	theory 	and	realism	in	its	presumption
that	States’	interests	are	socially	constituted	and	endogenous	rather	than	fixed	and	exogenous.
Constructivists	believe	that	interaction	among	States	affects	States’	interests	and	identities,	which
can	change	as	a	result	of	communication	and	learning	that	takes	place	in	the	international	society.
Interaction	among	States	builds	trust	among	them,	creating	stable	expectations	about	others’
behaviour.	In	this	process,	collective	identities	become	slowly	embedded,	paving	the	way	for
enhanced	co-operation.	In	its	focus	on	the	origin	of	interests,	constructivism	is	complementary	to
traditional,	rationalist	 regime	theory 	that	pays	little	attention	to	the	actual	formation	of	States’
preferences.
34		Constructivist	theory	has	developed	theories	on	the	relationship	between	regimes	and	ideas
and	identities.	According	to	constructivists,	a	shared	identity	among	States	increases	the	likelihood
of	regime	formation.	Regimes	shape	States’	interests	by	encouraging	a	convergence	of
preferences	and	cultivating	a	sense	of	shared	identity.	Regimes	can	hence	facilitate	co-operation
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by	affecting	States’	interests	and	identities.	In	this	particular	sense,	constructivists	can	be	seen	to
attribute	an	even	more	important	role	for	regimes	than	neoliberal	institutionalists	do.
G.		Relevance	of	 Regime	Theory 	in	Practice
35		International	relations	today	are	increasingly	legalized.	States	frequently	conduct	their
international	affairs	in	the	form	of	international	agreements	and	co-operate	within	the	framework	of
formal	institutions.	There	are	many	instances	of	international	co-operation—including	in	trade,
environment,	human	rights,	and	collective	security	among	many	other	issues—that	have	been
established	and	that	continue	to	take	place	within	international	regimes.
36		Regime	theory ,	like	other	paradigms	of	international	relations,	helps	international	lawyers	to
understand	patterns	of	behaviour	in	inter-State	relations.	Different	international	relations	theories
suggest	different	legal	and	political	responses	to	collective	action	problems	that	impede	co-
operation	among	States.	Thus,	international	lawyers	can	draw	on	 regime	theory ,	among	other
international	relations	paradigms,	when	analysing	substantive	legal	problems	and	designing	legal
solutions	to	solve	them.
37		Regime	theory 	helps	international	lawyers	to	explain	the	structure	and	the	function	of
particular	international	rules	and	institutions	and	analyse	the	ways	international	regimes	can	shape
international	law	and	international	relations	in	general.	The	insights	developed	by	regime	theorists
can	be	valuable	for	lawyers	seeking	to	understand,	for	instance,	why	some	international
agreements	are	easier	to	reach	than	others;	how	States	should	structure	the	process	of	negotiating
international	obligations;	why	some	international	agreements	break	down	and	others	succeed;
when	and	why	States	comply	with	their	legal	obligations	and,	conversely,	when	and	why	they	fail	to
do	so;	how	international	institutions	facilitate	compliance	with	international	law;	and	what	type	of
legal	instruments	best	address	particular	types	of	international	problems.
38		Regime	theory 	focuses	on	descriptive	questions	instead	of	a	normative	analysis.	The	theory
seeks	to	explain	and	predict	State	behaviour	and	international	outcomes,	leaving	aside	questions
such	as	what	is	a	legally	justifiable	way	for	States	to	act.	It	adopts	an	external	as	opposed	to	an
internal	perspective	on	law,	and	its	ability	to	answer	normative	questions	about	the	content	and
validity	of	international	law	is	therefore	limited.	Regime	theory 	cannot	replace	a	legal	analysis	of
the	international	system	but	its	explanatory	powers	can	be	harnessed	to	generate	both	theoretical
and	practical	insights	that	can	lead	to	a	richer	and	more	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	role
international	law	plays	in	international	relations.
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